/usr/man/cat.1/ssh.1.Z(/usr/man/cat.1/ssh.1.Z)
NAME
ssh - OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
SYNOPSIS
ssh [-1246AaCfgkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D
port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-i identity_file] [-L\fP
[bind_address:] port:host:hostport ] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O
ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-R\fP [bind_address:] port:host:host-
port ] [-S ctl_path] [user@]hostname [command]
DESCRIPTION
ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace
rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two
untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbi-
trary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user
name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine
using one of several methods depending on the protocol version used.
If command is specified, command is executed on the remote host instead
of a login shell.
SSH protocol version 1
The first authentication method is the rhosts or hosts.equiv method
combined with RSA-based host authentication. If the machine the user
logs in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv on
the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or
if the files $HOME/.rhosts or $HOME/.shosts exist in the user's home
directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name
of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the
user is considered for log in. Additionally, if the server can verify
the client's host key (see /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and
$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts in the FILES section), only then is login per-
mitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing. [Note to the administra-
tor: /etc/hosts.equiv, $HOME/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in
general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is
desired.]
As a second authentication method, ssh supports RSA based authentica-
tion. The scheme is based on public-key cryptography: there are cryp-
tosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
and it is not possible to derive the decryption key from the encryption
key. RSA is one such system. The idea is that each user creates a
public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows
the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
The file $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are per-
mitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells
the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The
server checks if this key is permitted, and if so, sends the user
(actually the ssh program running on behalf of the user) a challenge, a
random number, encrypted by the user's public key. The challenge can
only be decrypted using the proper private key. The user's client then
decrypts the challenge using the private key, proving that he/she knows
the private key but without disclosing it to the server.
ssh implements the RSA authentication protocol automatically. The user
creates his/her RSA key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores the
private key in $HOME/.ssh/identity and stores the public key in
$HOME/.ssh/identity.pub in the user's home directory. The user should
then copy the identity.pub to $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her
home directory on the remote machine (the authorized_keys file corre-
sponds to the conventional $HOME/.rhosts file, and has one key per
line, though the lines can be very long). After this, the user can log
in without giving the password.
The most convenient way to use RSA authentication may be with an
authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more information.
If other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a pass-
word. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
someone listening on the network.
SSH protocol version 2
When a user connects using protocol version 2, similar authentication
methods are available. Using the default values for PreferredAuthenti-
cations, the client will try to authenticate first using the hostbased
method; if this method fails, public key authentication is attempted,
and finally if this method fails, keyboard-interactive and password
authentication are tried.
The public key method is similar to RSA authentication described in the
previous section and allows the RSA or DSA algorithm to be used: The
client uses his private key, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa or $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa, to
sign the session identifier and sends the result to the server. The
server checks whether the matching public key is listed in
$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys and grants access if both the key is found
and the signature is correct. The session identifier is derived from a
shared Diffie-Hellman value and is only known to the client and the
server.
If public key authentication fails or is not available, a password can
be sent encrypted to the remote host to prove the user's identity.
Additionally, ssh supports hostbased or challenge response authentica-
tion.
Protocol 2 provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the
traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128 or Arcfour) and
integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-ripemd160). Note that protocol 1
lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection.
Login session and remote execution
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives
the user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with
the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the
user may use the escape characters noted below.
If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can
be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the
escape character to ``none'' will also make the session transparent
even if a tty is used.
The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
exits and all X11 and TCP/IP connections have been closed. The exit
status of the remote program is returned as the exit status of ssh.
Escape Characters
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
functions through the use of an escape character.
A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by
a character other than those described below. The escape character
must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape
character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
The supported escapes (assuming the default `~' ) are:
~. Disconnect.
~^Z Background ssh.
~# List forwarded connections.
~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
X11 sessions to terminate.
~? Display a list of escape characters.
~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol
version 2 and if the peer supports it).
~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port
forwardings using the -L and -R options (see below). It also
allows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings
using -KR hostport. Basic help is available, using the -h
option.
~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol
version 2 and if the peer supports it).
X11 and TCP forwarding
If the ForwardX11 variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
the -X and -x options described later) and the user is using X11 (the
DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display
is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any
X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or
in configuration files.
The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with
a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens
because ssh creates a ``proxy'' X server on the server machine for for-
warding the connections over the encrypted channel.
ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server
machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization
cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any for-
warded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie
when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never
sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
If the ForwardAgent variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description
of the -A and -a options described later) and the user is using an
authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically for-
warded to the remote side.
Forwarding of arbitrary TCP/IP connections over the secure channel can
be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
One possible application of TCP/IP forwarding is a secure connection to
an electronic purse; another is going through firewalls.
Server authentication
ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing identifi-
cations for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored
in $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally,
the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
password authentication to prevent a trojan horse from getting the
user's password. Another purpose of this mechanism is to prevent man-
in-the-middle attacks which could otherwise be used to circumvent the
encryption. The StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to prevent
logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed.
ssh can be configured to verify host identification using fingerprint
resource records (SSHFP) published in DNS. The VerifyHostKeyDNS option
can be used to control how DNS lookups are performed. SSHFP resource
records can be generated using ssh-keygen(1).
The options are as follows:
-1 Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only.
-2 Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only.
-4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
-A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This
can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration
file.
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key mate-
rial from the agent, however they can perform operations on the
keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities
loaded into the agent.
-a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
-b bind_address
Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
interfaces or aliased addresses.
-C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections). The
compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1), and the
``level'' can be controlled by the CompressionLevel option for
protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and
other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast
networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis
in the configuration files; see the Compression option.
-c cipher_spec
Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The
suported values are ``3des'', ``blowfish'' and ``des''. 3des
(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three
different keys. It is believed to be secure. blowfish is a
fast block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster
than 3des. des is only supported in the ssh client for interop-
erability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not
support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to
cryptographic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''.
For protocol version 2 cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of
ciphers listed in order of preference. The supported ciphers
are ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'',
``aes256-cbc'', ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'',
``arcfour'', ``blowfish-cbc'', and ``cast128-cbc''. The default
is
``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
-D port
Specifies a local ``dynamic'' application-level port forwarding.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the con-
nection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the applica-
tion protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from
the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols
are supported, and ssh will act as a SOCKS server. Only root
can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also
be specified in the configuration file.
-e ch | ^ch | none
Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: `~'
) . The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of
a line. The escape character followed by a dot (`.') closes
the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting
the character to ``none'' disables any escapes and makes the
session fully transparent.
-F configfile
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a con-
figuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
default for the per-user configuration file is $HOME/.ssh/con-
fig.
-f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This
implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
-g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
-I smartcard_device
Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument is the
device ssh should use to communicate with a smartcard used for
storing the user's private RSA key.
-i identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for RSA or
DSA authentication is read. The default is $HOME/.ssh/identity
for protocol version 1, and $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa and
$HOME/.ssh/id_dsa for protocol version 2. Identity files may
also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
It is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identi-
ties specified in configuration files).
-k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
server.
-L [bind_address:] port:host:hostport
Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to
be forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever
a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded
over the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port
hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be
specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be
specified with an alternative syntax:
[bind_address/] port/host/ hostport or by enclosing the address
in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may
be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port
be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*' indi-
cates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-l login_name
Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This
also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration
file.
-M Places the ssh client into ``master'' mode for connection shar-
ing. Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5)
for details.
-m mac_spec
Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of
MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in
order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information.
-N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just for-
warding ports (protocol version 2 only).
-n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh
program will be put in the background. (This does not work if
ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
option.)
-O ctl_cmd
Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: ``check''
(check that the master process is running) and ``exit'' (request
the master to exit).
-o option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configura-
tion file. This is useful for specifying options for which
there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the
options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_con-
fig(5).
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
CheckHostIP
Cipher
Ciphers
ClearAllForwardings
Compression
CompressionLevel
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
DynamicForward
EscapeChar
ForwardAgent
ForwardX11
ForwardX11Trusted
GatewayPorts
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
HostName
IdentityFile
IdentitiesOnly
KbdInteractiveDevices
LocalForward
LogLevel
MACs
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
Port
PreferredAuthentications
Protocol
ProxyCommand
PubkeyAuthentication
RemoteForward
RhostsRSAAuthentication
RSAAuthentication
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SmartcardDevice
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
UsePrivilegedPort
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
XAuthLocation
-p port
Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-q Quiet mode. Causes all warning and diagnostic messages to be
suppressed.
-R [bind_address:] port:host:hostport
Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to
be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This
works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote
side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the con-
nection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
is made to host port hostport from the local machine.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration
file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as
root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by
enclosing the address in square braces or using an alternative
syntax:
[bind_address/] host/port/ hostport
By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to
the loopback interface only. This may be overriden by specify-
ing a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address `*',
indicates that the remote socket should listen on all inter-
faces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if
the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5))
.
-S ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection shar-
ing. Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster
in ssh_config(5) for details.
-s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which
facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other appli-
cations (eg. sftp(1)) . The subsystem is specified as the
remote command.
-T Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
-t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute arbi-
trary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
very useful, e.g., when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
-V Display the version number and exit.
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentica-
tion, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options increase
the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
-X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-
host basis in a configuration file.
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 dis-
play through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be
able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y
option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
more information.
-x Disables X11 forwarding.
-Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
CONFIGURATION FILES
ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configu-
ration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and
configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
ENVIRONMENT
ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
DISPLAY
The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
It is automatically set by ssh to point to a value of the form
``hostname:n'' where hostname indicates the host where the shell
runs, and n is an integer 1. ssh uses this special value to
forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user
should normally not set DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render
the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manu-
ally copy any required authorization cookies).
HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
LOGNAME
Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with systems that use
this variable.
MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when compiling ssh.
SSH_ASKPASS
If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the
current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh does not
have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS
and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particu-
larly useful when calling ssh from a .xsession or related
script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to re-
direct the input from /dev/null to make this work.)
SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a unix-domain socket used to communicate
with the agent.
SSH_CONNECTION
Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The
variable contains four space-separated values: client ip-
address, client port number, server ip-address and server port
number.
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
The variable contains the original command line if a forced com-
mand is executed. It can be used to extract the original argu-
ments.
SSH_TTY
This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associ-
ated with the current shell or command. If the current session
has no tty, this variable is not set.
TZ The timezone variable is set to indicate the present timezone if
it was set when the daemon was started (i.e., the daemon passes
the value on to new connections).
USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
Additionally, ssh reads $HOME/.ssh/environment, and adds lines
of the format ``VARNAME=value'' to the environment if the file
exists and if users are allowed to change their environment.
For more information, see the PermitUserEnvironment option in
sshd_config(5).
FILES
$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that
are not in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts. See sshd(8).
$HOME/.ssh/identity, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the authentication identity of the user. They are for
protocol 1 RSA, protocol 2 DSA, and protocol 2 RSA, respec-
tively. These files contain sensitive data and should be read-
able by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/exe-
cute). Note that ssh ignores a private key file if it is acces-
sible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when
generating the key; the passphrase will be used to encrypt the
sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
$HOME/.ssh/identity.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication (public part of the
identity file in human-readable form). The contents of the
$HOME/.ssh/identity.pub file should be added to the file
$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes
to log in using protocol version 1 RSA authentication. The con-
tents of the $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub and $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
file should be added to $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys on all
machines where the user wishes to log in using protocol version
2 DSA/RSA authentication. These files are not sensitive and can
(but need not) be readable by anyone. These files are never
used automatically and are not necessary; they are only provided
for the convenience of the user.
$HOME/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because
of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permis-
sions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in
as this user. The format of this file is described in the
sshd(8) manual page. In the simplest form the format is the
same as the .pub identity files. This file is not highly sensi-
tive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be pre-
pared by the system administrator to contain the public host
keys of all machines in the organization. This file should be
world-readable. This file contains public keys, one per line,
in the following format (fields separated by spaces): system
name, public key and optional comment field. When different
names are used for the same machine, all such names should be
listed, separated by commas. The format is described in the
sshd(8) manual page.
The canonical system name (as returned by name servers) is used
by sshd(8) to verify the client host when logging in; other
names are needed because ssh does not convert the user-supplied
name to a canonical name before checking the key, because some-
one with access to the name servers would then be able to fool
host authentication.
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configura-
tion options are described in ssh_config(5).
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key,
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These three files contain the private parts of the host keys and
are used for RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentica-
tion. If the protocol version 1 RhostsRSAAuthentication method
is used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable
only by root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8)
to access the host keys for HostbasedAuthentication. This elim-
inates the requirement that ssh be setuid root when that authen-
tication method is used. By default ssh is not setuid root.
$HOME/.rhosts
This file is used in RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAu-
thentication authentication to list the host/user pairs that are
permitted to log in. (Note that this file is also used by
rlogin and rsh, which makes using this file insecure.) Each
line of the file contains a host name (in the canonical form
returned by name servers), and then a user name on that host,
separated by a space. On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on a NFS parti-
tion, because sshd(8) reads it as root. Additionally, this file
must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions
for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines
is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
Note that sshd(8) allows authentication only in combination with
client host key authentication before permitting log in. If the
server machine does not have the client's host key in
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, it can be stored in
$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. The easiest way to do this is to con-
nect back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this
will automatically add the host key to $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts.
$HOME/.shosts
This file is used exactly the same way as .rhosts. The purpose
for having this file is to be able to use RhostsRSAAuthentica-
tion and HostbasedAuthentication authentication without permit-
ting login with rlogin() or rsh(1).
/etc/hosts.equiv
This file is used during RhostsRSAAuthentication and Host-
basedAuthentication authentication. It contains canonical hosts
names, one per line (the full format is described in the sshd(8)
manual page). If the client host is found in this file, login
is automatically permitted provided client and server user names
are the same. Additionally, successful client host key authen-
tication is required. This file should only be writable by
root.
/etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
This file is processed exactly as /etc/hosts.equiv. This file
may be useful to permit logins using ssh but not using
rsh/rlogin.
/etc/ssh/sshrc
Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in
just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.
$HOME/.ssh/rc
Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in
just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.
$HOME/.ssh/environment
Contains additional definitions for environment variables, see
section ENVIRONMENT above.
DIAGNOSTICS
ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
error occurred.
SEE ALSO
gzip(1), rsh(1), scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-key-
gen(1), telnet(1), hosts.equiv(5), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8),
sshd(8)
S. Lehtinen, T. Rinne, M. Saarinen, T. Kivinen and T. Ylonen, SSH Pro-
tocol Architecture, draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-12.txt, January 2002,
work in progress material.
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features
and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
September 25, 1999 SSH(1)
See also slogin(1): man 1 slogin
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